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ABSTRACT

Author: Lee, Pei-Ting. MS
Institution: Purdue University
Degree Received: May 2018
Title: Exploitation of the Cloud: Comparing the Perspectives of Cybercriminals and
Cybersecurity Experts
Major Professor: Kathryn Seigfred-Spellar
As the rise of cloud technology bring about new possibilities to businesses and
individuals alike, it also provides cybercriminals with new forms of weapons. The
accessibility and availability of computing resources that have induced consumers to
increasingly shift their data to the cloud can also be exploited by cybercriminals to facilitate
attacks. Therefore, it is important to understand the different ways the cloud environment
can be abused by cybercriminals. Analyzing the most commonly reported misuse of the
cloud from the cybercriminals’ point of view can allow cloud service providers to
reevaluate their policies and infrastructure to decrease, if not prevent, abuse of the cloud.
The responses collected from cybercriminals and cybersecurity experts indicated cloud
storage to be the cloud service most often used for illegal purposes. Furthermore, the
anonymity provided by the ease in creating fake accounts and the low price of services
were reported as major factors influencing cybercriminals in choosing to use the cloud.
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INTRODUCTION

Since its emergence in 2006, when Google CEO Eric Schmidt first used the term in its
modern context, cloud computing has drastically changed the landscape of information
technology, introducing new ways services can be created, delivered, accessed, and
managed (Regaledo, 2010; Marturana, Me, & Tacconi, 2012). The agility, scalability, cost
benefits, and innovation of the cloud environment is attracting more and more consumers.
The public cloud market grew from $175 billion in 2015 to $209.2 billion in 2016, and is
predicted to grow another 18% in 2017 (Gartner, 2017). With computing power as a utility,
developers and clients can take advantage of the resources offered in the cloud instead of
investing in their own hardware and software infrastructure. This need is especially
apparent with the increasing demand of compute-intensive workloads, such as artificial
intelligence and Internet of Things, adopted by both enterprises and start-ups (Gartner,
2017).
The National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) defined cloud
computing as a “model for enabling ubiquitous, convenient, on-demand network access to
a shared pool of configurable computing resources that can be rapidly provisioned and
released with minimal management effort” (NIST, 2011, p.2). There are three service
models for cloud computing, each offering a different layer of abstraction. Software as a
Service (SaaS) allows consumers to use provider’s applications running on the cloud
infrastructure. Platform as a Service (PaaS) manages the hosting environment, including
libraries, operating systems, and storage, for consumers to deploy their own applications
on. Infrastructure as a Service (IaaS) provides the consumers with the most control over
resources. Although consumers still do not have control of the cloud infrastructure, they
can provision fundamental computing resources and manage operating systems, storage,
network components (NIST, 2011).
Businesses and individual consumers had gradually shifted their data and services
to the cloud, but they were not the only ones benefitting from this new form of technology.
The cloud environment and its abundance of cost effective, scalable resources were shaping
to become new weapons for cybercriminals. The Cloud Security Alliance (CSA) had
reported a considerable rise in cloud vulnerability, largely caused by the easy user account

2
registration made possible by cloud service providers (Pichan, Lazarescu, & Soh, 2015).
In its 2016 report on the top threats in cloud computing, CSA identified abuse and nefarious
use of cloud services as one of them. It listed examples of misuse of cloud service-based
resources, including distributed denial-of-service (DDoS) attacks, email spam, phishing
campaigns, mining for digital currency, brute-force compute attacks of stolen credential
databases, and hosting of malicious or pirated content in the cloud (CSA, 2016). A report
issued by Microsoft in 2016 likewise warned IT organizations of cybercriminals
weaponizing the cloud (Hernandez, 2016). In the report, Microsoft stated that
cybercriminals can compromise virtual machines in the cloud, manage and control them
like botnets, and launch distributed denial-of-service (DDoS) attacks with increasing scale
(Hernandez, 2016).

1.1

Problem Statement

In 2011, an attacker crippled Sony’s PlayStation Network and compromised more
than 100 million customer accounts using Amazon’s Elastic Compute Cloud (EC2)
(Galante, Khan, & Alpeyev, 2011). This was not the only example of how the cheap and
convenient virtual machines offered by cloud providers could be used for less than
appropriate purposes. The computing powers that consumers with compute-intensive
workloads, such as big data analysis or previously mentioned artificial intelligence, relied
on, can also be exploited by malicious users into cracking passwords. According to
Garfinkel (2011), the time and cost needed to crack the encryption key used to protect WiFi networks with Amazon’s EC2 was six minutes and $1.68. Crimes that used to require
the perpetrators to buy multiple computers has now become much more affordable and
accessible. As a matter of fact, two researchers at a Black Hat conference showed how to
build a cloud-based botnet for no money at all, using only the resources available from the
free trial offers from most cloud providers (Hardy, 2014).
The appearance of the near infinite amount of computing power wasn’t the only
feature of the cloud environment that could be exploited by cybercriminals. Setting up
botnets and utilizing Amazon’s EC2 machines only touched on the Infrastructure-as-aService (IaaS) level of cloud computing. Deployment environments offered as Platformas-a-Service (PaaS) and online applications provided as Software-as-a-Service (SaaS) had
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proved to be as useful to cyber criminals as the raw computing powers of IaaS virtual
machines.
There were numerous ways for people to use legitimate PaaS and SaaS for
malicious intentions. For example, mail services, such as Gmail, could be used to trade
information and illegal files between cybercriminals. Even innocuous web applications,
such as the text storage site Pastebin, were being used as a platform to share stolen credit
card information. A simple search of the keyword “Visa” on Pastebin showed large
amounts of “text files” stored with credit card numbers, security codes, and expiration dates
available to the public (Garfinkel, 2011). Some researchers also expressed concerns on
cloud storage being used by people for illegal contents, such as child pornography (Biggs
& Vidalis, 2009). The relative ease in using SaaS provided services, targeted at
accommodating the general population, also lowered the bar for people with malicious
intent in taking advantage of this new technology.
In some cases, the legitimacy of the service was the exact reason these services
were chosen in the first place. Cloud platforms were sometimes utilized to carry out email
spam or phishing campaigns. Since the source of these spam and phishing emails would be
traced back to the cloud provider, taking advantage of the legitimacy and reputation of the
cloud provider could help these emails bypass the filters of email services and not get
blocked (Kolthof, 2015). Similarly, hosting phishing sites on the platforms offered by large
cloud providers allowed these sites to have actual valid certificates, which would not only
be deemed safe by web browsers but also seem more trustworthy to the unsuspecting
victims (Garfinkel, 2011). The cloud environment not only provide near endless amount
and variety of resources to those with malicious intentions to exploit, but also make their
attacks easier by taking advantage of the reputation of the cloud providers. In the attacks
witnessed by Microsoft on its own Azure cloud computing platform, over 20 percent were
spam, which is significantly higher than the 7.6 percent of attempted DDoS attacks
(Hernandez, 2016).

1.2

Research question

The main question studied in this thesis was:
•

How is cloud computing abused by cybercriminals and why?
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Throughout this study, the following sub-questions were explored to answer the main
research question:
o What are the most common misuses and reasons reported by cybercriminals?
o What are the most common misuses and reasons identified by cybersecurity
experts?
o What are the similarities and differences in responses between cybercriminals
and cybersecurity experts?

1.3

Significance

As the misuse of cloud computing increases and advances alongside the technology
itself, it is important to understand how the cloud environment, with its abundant of
resources, can be abused by those with malicious intent. There have been many
speculations and concerns from security researchers and companies in this regard, but none
that addressed this problem from the actual perpetrators’ point of view (Biggs & Vdalis,
2009; Taylor, Haggerty, Gresty, & Lamb, 2011). Furthermore, this study also examined
the main reasons those individuals chose the cloud for their purposes. Vulnerabilities in
cloud providers’ policies as well as the legal justice system may have induced
cybercriminals in taking advantage of the cloud, and the cybercriminals’ reasons in
choosing the cloud as their choice of tool could indicate these vulnerabilities. For example,
if the reason in using the cloud was the ability to use resources under fake accounts, it could
indicate the lack of strict policies and verification in account creations from cloud providers.
Understanding the common ways and reasons cybercriminals exploited the cloud
for committing crime could show cloud providers the kinds of services that were more
susceptible to abuse, and policy loopholes that cybercriminals could take advantage of.
This could point cloud providers in the right direction to in turn implement stricter policies
and detection mechanisms. Finally, this study compared law enforcement and
cybersecurity experts’ views on these questions to determine whether the general concerns
and challenges identified by them were the same as what the attackers think.
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1.4

Assumptions

As this study is based on the survey responses from cybercriminals and cybersecurity
experts, the following assumptions were made.
•

All participants answered the questions honestly and to the best of their
abilities. Their responses were not included in the final analysis if they were
determined to be false or exaggerated by the BDIR test.

•

All participants understood what is being asked and know what their past
actions are called. For example, if they had committed DDoS attacks in the
past, assumed that they know those were called “DDoS attacks.”

1.5

Limitations

The limitations for this study include:
•

When surveying the perpetrators, the study only included individuals who
had self-proclaimed to some sort of cybercrime.

•

Cybersecurity experts were limited to those that have graduated from school
and are currently working in a cybersecurity related field

•

The survey was anonymous with no information linking to the participants

•

The sample population were gathered from two hacker forums, which may
not be representative of all cybercriminals.

•

Neither of the two forums chosen were from the dark web

•

The types of misuses and reasons were obtained from those identified by
previous studies, and may not include all possibilities.

1.6

Delimitations

This study looked at the misuse of cloud resources by cybercriminals. However,
acknowledging the fact that different types of perpetrators with different levels of resources
would affect the way they used cloud technologies, there was a need to distinguish those
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individuals acting alone, those acting in groups, and state-sponsored attackers. There were
some delimitations to the subject of this study, which are listed below:
•

This study only looked at the criminal behaviors of cybercriminals in the US

•

Since not all misuses of the cloud were considered crimes, this study focused
on the criminal behaviors and not other deviant uses.

•

This study focused on the individual actors, whose available resources and
technical knowledge were more representative of the general consumers.
State-sponsored attackers or those in groups will have more budget to spend
on obtaining their desired cloud resources while having more specific
purposes and their own agenda. In these cases, their reasons for using the
cloud might not be as indicative of vulnerabilities of the cloud.

1.7

Summary

This chapter described the underlying issue of cybercriminals taking advantage of the
abundant of resources available on the cloud, and the importance for cloud providers and
law enforcement in understanding them to better prevent or detect these exploitations. This
chapter also outlined the main research questions, significance, assumptions, limitations,
and delimitations of this study. The next chapter reviews the history of cybercrime and the
issues in cloud security and forensics that lead to misuses of the cloud.
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2.1

LITERATURE REVIEW

Types of Cybercrime

With the advances of technology in the Digital Age, crime, along with many other
aspects of life, had shifted into cyberspace. Cybercrime refers to criminal activities
committed through the Internet, which also falls into the three major categories of computer
crimes: computer as the target of the offenses, computer as tool for committing crimes, and
computer as an incidental device that may contain digital evidence (Goodman & Brenner,
2002; Holt, Bossler, & Seigfried-Spellar, 2015). There is a large range of activities that can
be considered cybercrimes, such as hacking, malicious programs, online fraud and theft,
child pornography, and cyberterrorism (Goodman & Brenner, 2002).
Walls (2001) created a four-category typology of cybercrime: cyber-trespass, cyberdeception and theft, cyber-porn and obscenity, and cyber-violence. Cyber-trespass refered
to gaining unauthorized access in an online environment, such as hacking into other
people’s accounts or attempting to access systems they do not own (Holt et al., 2015).
Examples of ways to gain unauthorized access to accounts were password cracking and
phishing. Password cracking involved running programs to guess the password through
brute force, and phishing led to the second category, cyber-deception and theft. Phishing
attacks were examples of computers being used as a tool. Attackers posed as legitimate
sources and sent out emails with links to fraudulent websites where users are deceived into
entering valuable personal information, such as username and password (Holt et al., 2015).
Another example of cyber-deception and theft was digital piracy, where pirates broke
copyright protections on DVDs and software and distributed them, causing financial losses
to the copyright holder (Holt et al., 2015). The use of computers had also made stealing
credit card information easier, allowing criminals involved in the scam to steal large
amounts of money before being caught (Goodman & Brenner, 2002).
The third category in Walls’ (2011) typology referred to the pornographic contents
online, such as child porn or non-consented adult porn, which were illegal in many
countries. The last category, cyber-violence, involved sending or accessing hurtful or
dangerous materials online (Holt et al., 2015). This included using computers to promote
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certain groups’ beliefs and connect interested parties. An example of this is conducting a
DDoS attack, which overloads servers with requests, making the services unavailable to
their intended users (Holt et al., 2015).
In the case of DDoS attacks, unlike many other cybercrimes described previously,
computers were the targets. These types of crimes aimed to break into computers or cause
damages to them. Malicious programs, or malware, were often used for these. Malware are
programs developed to disrupt computer operations, gather sensitive data, or gain access
to private systems (Holt et al., 2015). Viruses and worms spread to other computers and
can often be destructive, deleting files or damaging systems (Goodman & Brenner, 2002).
Trojans masqueraded as legitimate programs while containing hidden features, such as
creating trap doors for attackers to access the infected computer, or stealing user-IDs and
passwords and erasing files (Goodman & Brenner, 2002; Holt et al., 2015). Essentially,
malware is destructive programs often utilized by cybercriminals to automate attacks and
simplify processes of hacking (Holt et al., 2015).

2.2

Cloud Computing

To understand how cloud computing can be abused by cybercriminals, it is important
to first understand the architecture and nature of cloud computing. Generally, cloud
computing offered computing as a utility, freeing developers and businesses from large
expenses in hardware when deploying their services. Cloud computing included two
aspects, the applications delivered as services over the Internet, and the hardware and
systems software in the data centers that provide those services (Armbrust et al., 2010).
The “cloud” referred to the data center hardware and software, which acted as servers for
clients. The three essential parts of any application were computation, storage, and
communication (Armbrust et al., 2010). The cloud offered all of these on demand. Cloud
computing was made possible by virtualization, with different levels of abstraction and
management of resources available depending on the need of consumers.
The cloud had five essential characteristics and three service models, as defined by
NIST (2011). The three main service models for the cloud were Software-as-a-Service
(SaaS), Platform- as-a-Service (PaaS), and Infrastructure-as-a-Service (IaaS). For SaaS,
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the software deployed on the cloud is available for use to consumers through a client or
program interface, such as web browser (NIST 2011). However, the control of the
applications and the infrastructure that it was built upon are inaccessible by the users,
meaning they cannot manage application settings and their data (Pichan, Lazarescu, & Soh,
2015). This model was mainly aimed at end users. PaaS, on the other hand, was where
consumers can deploy their own applications onto the cloud infrastructure provided by
cloud service providers. The consumers used the programming languages, libraries,
services, and tools supported by the providers (NIST, 2011). For example, a web developer
could deploy their website onto the cloud platform without the need to configure or set up
any servers. This benefited a web developer by eliminating the need to buy and manage
the underlying hardware and software platform, such as databases, operating systems and
developing tools (Pichan, Lazarescu, & Soh, 2015). IaaS was the model that offered the
most control for consumers. Consumers could purchase all the components of a basic
computing infrastructure, including servers, software, and network equipment on demand.
These components were offered as virtualized objects that consumers could control and
manage through a service interface. For example, a user using IaaS would be able to buy
their own virtual machines and configure the machines according to their needs, including
system and network configurations. The only thing they were not able to control was the
physical components on which the virtual machines are hosted.
NIST (2011) outlined five characteristics of cloud computing: on-demand selfservice, broad network access, resource pooling, rapid elasticity, and measured service.
Consumers can provision computing resources and network storage on-demand over the
network. For the providers, they pool multiple consumers’ resources together using a multitenant model, assigning physical and virtual resources dynamically according to demand
(NIST, 2011). The rapid elasticity of cloud allowed automatic provision and release,
enabling consumers to rapidly scale their resources depending on usage.
Compared to private data centers, the cloud offered many advantages. In the cloud,
there appeared to be an infinite amount of computing resources available on demand.
Furthermore, it eliminated up-front commitment by cloud users and enabled them to pay
for the computing resources on a short-term basis if required (Armbrust et al., 2010). These
benefited consumers whose demand for computation varied over time or unknown in
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advance. For example, small businesses could start with only a few virtual machines and
gradually add new ones as their companies grew. Businesses might have sudden spikes in
their traffic which required larger computing power followed by a reduction after some
time; this would result in under provisioning or over provisioning in private data centers
without the elasticity of the cloud (Armbrust et al., 2010).
However, along with the advantages brought by the cloud, researchers have also
identified several security and forensics issues accompanying the cloud computing
environment. It is important to explore these issues first before studying the methods and
motivations of perpetrators’ abuse of the cloud. The security vulnerabilities and challenges
in cloud computing that make investigating cybercrime in the cloud hard could be
implications of why people with malicious intent chose the cloud as their choice of weapon.
In the following sections, issues and challenges in cloud security and forensics were
reviewed in two categories, technical and legal, before looking at existing studies on the
misuse of cloud computing.

2.3

Technical Issues

One important security threat presented by the cloud environment originates from its
multitenancy attribute (Ren, Wang, & Wang, 2012). In cloud computing, cloud service
providers often used hardware virtualization that let multiple users run their distinct
instances on the same physical machine. The computing resources rented by users were in
the forms of virtual machines, which meant that different users’ virtual machines resided
on the same physical server. This type of resource sharing presented two types of
vulnerability, data leakage and attack on the virtualization and/or physical hardware layers
directly (Hay, Nance, & Bishop, 2011). Hay et al. (2011) pointed out that in these cases,
users storing sensitive data or running critical processes in the cloud would have to entirely
rely on the virtualization layer’s ability to ensure isolation of their operations. This
vulnerability could also lead to attackers placing their virtualized application instance
intentionally on the same physical machine as the target victim. From there, they could
analyze traffic patterns and other side-channel information to obtain their victim’s private
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information or attacking the virtualization or physical layer directly to influence their target
(Hay et al., 2011; Ren et al., 2012).
Pichan, Lazarescu, and Soh (2015) studied the digital forensic challenges faced by
investigators in the cloud environment, and included possible solutions based on recent
development in cloud forensics. The nature of cloud computing added layers of complexity
in the technical, organizational, and legal aspects when conducting forensic investigations.
The authors analyzed the challenges faced in each phase of the Digital Investigative
Process model during cloud forensics. Some of the main challenges included: decentralized
data, jurisdiction, encryption, multi-tenancy, and dependence on cloud service providers
(Pichan et al., 2015). Clients often do not have access to lower layers of their machines;
and the data might be stored on physical machines anywhere in the world. Moreover, in
the area of network forensics, where network traffic and logs were the main sources of
evidence, they were often not accessible to consumers, and acquisition of them were
heavily dependent on the cooperation of cloud service providers (Pichan et al., 2015).
Ruan, Carthy, Kechadi, and Crosbie (2011) suggested that the multi-tenant
environment and virtualization offered in the cloud provided technical challenges for
forensic investigations, and compartmentalization was required for data collection and
investigation in order to not breach the privacy of other clients on the same servers. The
different models of cloud computing offered consumers, and in turn, investigators,
different levels of control.
Freet, Agrawal, John, and Walker (2015) analyzed the challenges in cloud forensics
from the standpoint of different service models. They pointed out that in SaaS models, only
cloud service providers (CSP) were able to configure and manage the application
operations and access their related data. Because of this, it was difficult to collect important
sources of evidence such as logs for applications, processes, and networks. Moreover, it
was basically impossible to install or configure any sort of forensic toolkit in SaaS
environments. Similar difficulties were faced in the PaaS environment. Data and logs not
in the application level were inaccessible. As for IaaS models, Freet et al. (2015) identified
similar challenges as previous researches. Virtual machines became vulnerable due to the
shared network infrastructure on the same physical machine among different customers. If
a virtual machine was compromised, it could attack another virtual machine in the shared
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network. Also, if the hypervisor in charge of managing the virtual machines was
misconfigured in anyway, a Denial of Service attack was possible as it allowed one virtual
machine to use up all the system resources at the expense of others on the network (Freet
et al., 2015).
Research also identified the volatile nature of data in cloud environments as a major
issue (Birk & Wegener, 2011; Taylor et al., 2011). While data were considered volatile in
general in digital forensics, the on-demand characteristic of the cloud means that data could
be lost if the virtual machine is rebooted or powered down (Birk & Wegener, 2011). Birk
and Wegener (2011) discussed the issues of forensic investigations in cloud computing
environments from technical aspects. Other than the similar challenges faced in acquiring
evidence from the different service models identified by other researchers described above,
they also pointed out the lack of persistent storage for IaaS virtual machines. Although
customers could choose to buy persistent storage, the fact that these virtual machines did
not come with persistent storage could lead to several issues. If an instance was abused for
sending spam or joining botnets and the attacker powers off the virtual machine and cancel
the contract with the CSP after the attack, most of the evidence data would be destroyed
(Birk & Wegener, 2011).
Taylor et al. (2011) also addressed the problem of volatile data in evidence
acquisitions in their discussion of forensic investigations of cloud computing systems.
They indicated that in cloud computing systems, digital evidences were more ethereal and
dynamic because of the virtual environments provided. For example, if a user accessed a
software application via a cloud computing system, data such as registry entries or
temporary Internet files that would traditionally be written to the operating system would
be lost when the user exits the cloud (Taylor et al., 2011).
Hay et al. (2011) also distinguished the issue of the ephemeral nature of cloud
resources. They further mentioned that in the cloud environment, once virtual machines
are decommissioned and returned to the cloud, they were likely to be used by other hosts.
Once the resources were used by other customers, recovering data from the original virtual
machine was near impossible (Hay et al., 2011). In Grounds and Cheesbro’s (2013) study
analyzing the challenges face in the acquisition of eDiscovery evidence, they too identified
this as a potential pitfall. Grounds and Cheesbro (2013) stated that because the cloud
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environment changed at a rapid pace, electronically stored information was overwritten,
recycled, updated, modified, copied, or moved elsewhere regularly. In digital forensics,
restoring deleted files from hard disks was only possible if the locations they were stored
were not overwritten by something else. However, in a dynamic environment like the cloud,
once a user’s resources were decommissioned, they were quickly overwritten and used for
other users, making it impossible to restore these data (Grounds & Cheesbro, 2013).
Furthermore, the distributed and decentralized nature of cloud computing also
posed challenges for evidence acquisition (Freet et al., 2015). Investigators might not be
able to locate the data because of its distribution. In traditional digital forensics,
investigators could seize a system for examination, commonly the computer or other
electronic equipment; however, in the cloud, it was hard to define what comprises of a
“system” to be examined (Freet et al., 2015). The same virtual disk file may have been
written to many areas, on multiple physical storage devices, as the cloud resource was
being migrated. Hence it was difficult to locate all the historical record of that “system”,
since they were likely distributed in various locations (Freet et al., 2015). In cloud
environments, a variety of applications were delivered to the users seamlessly in a way that
to the users, it seemed as though they were accessing a single site (Taylor et al., 2011).
Because of this, when one application was delivered to the user, it probably came from
distributed sources, which makes the identification of sources of potential evidence more
complex.
Lastly, the lack of standardized tools available to deal with the versatile cloud
environment also presented a challenge to cloud forensics (Reilly, Wren, & Berry, 2010).
Like mobile platforms, there were several virtualization platforms, and there was a lack of
standardization and cross-platform development in tools developed for forensic extraction
of data from the cloud environment (Taylor et al., 2011).

2.4

Legal Issues

Of all the legal issues identified by numerous researchers, the most common one was
the issue of jurisdiction. In the study conducted by Freet et al. (2015), two of the top five
challenges for cloud forensics according to their survey were, jurisdiction and lack of
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international collaboration and legislative mechanism in cross-nation data access and
exchange. Hay et al. (2011) pointed out that resources in the cloud are often not fixed in
any geographical location. They were often migrated between numerous physical locations.
Furthermore, backups and copies of the resources may also exist simultaneously, so
resources may exist in multiple legal jurisdictions, each having different rules on security
issues (Hay et al., 2011). Taylor et al. (2011) also indicated that in cloud computing it was
hard to know exactly where the data was being processed, and the processing might occur
in different jurisdictions.
Biggs and Vidalis (2009) raised the concern for cross-border legislation. The
location of digital data storage in relation to the user’s actual location might be different,
which would lead to some legal red tape during investigations (Biggs & Vidalis, 2009).
Taylor et al. (2011) also discussed the example of a suspect accessing an application on a
server based in the United States from a mobile phone in the United Kingdom. The
evidence from the application would mostly reside on the server in the US and in another
jurisdiction as the person of interest. Cross-jurisdictions also presented the problem of
different countries having different laws as to what consists of a crime. Even if all the
regions in question agreed to the crime, there was also the problem of which agency is
responsible for the investigation (Taylor et al., 2011). In Biggs and Vidalis’ (2009) study,
they suggested an overhaul of international legislation and obtain global unity in this aspect.
Another legal issue related to investigating the cloud was the difficulty in
maintaining a chain of custody and have the court legally accept the evidence (Grounds &
Cheesbro, 2013; Reilly et al., 2010). Even though there was a lack of standardized process
in digital investigations in general, even the commonly accepted procedures were
impractical in cloud investigations, since all the evidence resided in datacenters owned by
CSPs (Reilly et al., 2010). Dykstra and Sherman (2012) explored the technical and trust
issues faced in collecting forensic evidence from the cloud. The evidences collected during
a forensic investigation had to be admissible in court, meaning their validity had to be
trusted by the judges and jury. In cloud computing, there were many layers, most of which
were controlled by the CSPs. For example, in infrastructure-as-a-service cloud computing,
the client controlled the Guest OS and Guest application layers, but the virtualization, Host
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OS, physical hardware, and network layers were all out of their control. Acquisition at one
layer required trust in the ones below.
This led to the issue in service level agreements (SLA) of vendors. SLAs detailed
what kind of data were stored by the CSPs and was what investigators and customers
depended on to obtain what they want from the CSPs. However, vendors may not fully
encompass or realize the security issues, and even undermine the possibilities of people
attacking the cloud or misusing them (Biggs & Vidalis, 2009). SLAs are ineffective if they
were not implemented correctly. In the cloud environment, investigators and customers
were greatly dependent on CSPs who hold all the data and could decide which logs to
collect. Because of this, vendors’ policies and SLAs were important in cloud investigations.
In this aspect, privacy laws often prevented CSPs to monitor abuse of their resources by
malicious actors (Khorshed, Ali, & Wasimi, 2012).
The issues and challenges in cloud security and forensics identified by past research
are summarized in Table 2.1 below.
Table 2.1 Issues in Cloud Security and Forensics
Issues
No access to logs / Dependent on CSP

Jurisdiction

Volatile data

Decentralized data

Lack of standardized protocol/tools in
collecting evidence

Author
Freet et al. (2015)
Pichan et al. (2015)
Biggs & Vidalis (2009)
Freet et al. (2015)
Hay et al. (2011)
Pichan et al. (2015)
Taylor et al. (2011)
Birk & Wegener (2011)
Grounds & Cheesbro (2013)
Hay et al. (2011)
Reilly et al. (2010)
Taylor et al. (2011)
Freet et al. (2015)
Hay et al. (2011)
Pichan et al. (2015)
Taylor et al. (2011)
Dykstra & Sherman (2012)
Grounds & Cheesbro (2013)
Reilly et al. (2010)
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Biggs & Vidalis (2009)
Khorshed et al. (2012)
Modi, Patel, Borisaniya, Patel, &
Rajarajan (2013)
Ease of registration / Anonymity
Pichan et al. (2015)
Taylor et al. (2011)
Note. CSP = Cloud Service Provider; SLA = Service Level Agreement
Inefficient SLA

2.5

Misuse of Cloud Computing

Compared to the many studies on issues in cloud security and forensics, there were
few on types of cloud computing misuses. Hashizume, Yoshioka, and Fernandez (2011)
presented two examples of misuse patterns describing attacks found in the cloud. The first
example corresponded to the issue in resource sharing and multitenancy of the cloud
identified above. The attackers may place their virtual machine on the same physical server
as the target’s virtual machine on purpose. Through side-channel observations, they could
estimate traffic rates or detect cache activity spikes. The attacker could also initiate a kind
of DoS attack by requesting many resource so as to make them unavailable to others
sharing the same resources (Hashizume et al., 2011). The second attack using cloud
computing that the authors identified was creating a malicious virtual machine image and
infecting others when they create virtual machines from these images. In the cloud
environment, users often use pre-configured virtual machine images (most often offered
by the CSPs) to create their virtual machines. The attackers can create an image containing
malicious code, such as malware, and when others create their virtual machines from this
image, it will already be infected (Hashizume et al., 2011).
Kolthof (2015) discussed five different types of cybercrime using the cloud. The
first type was hosting malware programs, such as Trojans, on the cloud. The scalability of
cloud computing allowed malware hosts to serve large amounts of data and connections.
Other than malware, cloud computing could also be utilized to host other malicious
applications such as websites designed for scam or phishing. The third type was using cloud
computing services to send spam emails. These included phishing emails and emails
containing malware. The spammers could take advantage of the reputation of CSPs to
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deceive spam filters, since the source IP of these emails would come from legitimate and
reputable companies. The fourth type of attack was utilizing large numbers of virtual
machines to perform DDoS attacks. They could either create these virtual machines
themselves or compromise the machines of legitimate customers. The last type of
cybercrime identified by the author was using cloud services as command-and-control
servers for botnets. Again, the scalability of cloud services made this type of use effective,
as the machine in the cloud could control large number of devices, or bots (Kolthof, 2015).
While not the focus, other studies also mentioned different ways cloud computing
could be abused by malicious actors. Biggs and Vidalis (2009) stated a major concern in
cloud computing was the use of it by paedophiles. The cloud provided remote storage and
relative anonymity of the identity of the account holder, which could be exploited by these
types of criminals (Biggs & Vidalis, 2009). The anonymity in the cloud environment was
also discussed as a major issue in identifying suspects by Taylor et al. (2011). They stated
that identities within the cloud environment often relied on username and passwords, and
it was hard to link a specific username to a real person. Table 2.2 summarizes the possible
misuses of cloud computing by cybercriminals indicated by previous studies.
Table 2.2 Misuses of Cloud Computing
Misuse
Malware hosting
Host phishing websites
Send spam/phishing emails

Distributed Denial of Service

Botnet
Cloud storage

Author
Kolthof (2015)
Garfinkel (2011)
Kolthof (2015)
Modi et al. (2013)
Kolthof (2015)
Wall (2017)
CSA (2016)
Hernandez (2016)
Kolthof (2015)
Modi et al. (2013)
Wall (2017)
Kolthof (2015)
Kuyoro, Ibikunle, & Awodele (2011)
Wall (2017)
Biggs & Vidalis (2009)
CSA (2016)
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Garfinkel (2011)
Modi et al. (2013)

Password cracking

2.6

Summary

As the rise of cloud computing brings new possibilities for companies and individual
consumers, cybercriminals had likewise taken advantage of having computing as a utility,
and the abundant of services it provides. Issues had been raised in cloud security and cloud
forensics, pointing out vulnerabilities in the cloud infrastructure and the challenges faced
in investigating them. Some of the top issues identified by researchers include data
volatility, jurisdiction, and ease of registration leading to anonymity in the cloud. This
chapter also reviewed different forms of misuse of the cloud distinguished by past research,
such as malware hosting, DDoS, and storing illegal contents in the cloud. Drawing from
the issues and misuses depicted here, the current study aims to gain the perspective of
cybercriminals in utilizing cloud computing as weapons.
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3.1

METHODOLOGY

Hypothesis

Although research existed on security vulnerabilities and forensics challenges in
the cloud environment, they did not address the problem from the cybercriminals’ point of
view. This study analyzed the uses and reasons for cybercriminals using cloud computing
as their choice of tool. Based on previous research, the following hypotheses were
developed:
 : Cybercriminals self-report exploiting cloud storage more compared to other
types of misuses.
 : There is a correlation between misuses of the cloud and reasons for choosing
the cloud.
 : Cybercriminals and cybersecurity experts will report similar misuses of the
cloud and reasons for choosing the cloud.

3.2

Survey Design

The survey consisted of four sections after the validation questions (see Appendix
C). The validation questions at the start of the survey asked for the participants’ age and
residency status. Ineligible participants under the age of 18 or those who were not U.S.
permanent residents were filtered out and redirected to the end of the survey. This study
focused on behaviors considered as criminal according to U.S. laws, thus only U.S
permanent residents were recruited. The survey for cybersecurity experts had an additional
validation question asking them to self-report whether they identified as a cybersecurity
expert. Those who did not were filtered out and redirected to the end of the survey.
The first section of the survey collected basic demographic data from the participants.
The demographic section was placed at the start of the survey because these questions are
relatively easy to answer and can help ease the respondents into more sensitive questions
later (Rea & Parker, 2005). The demographic section collected information such as age,
education level, employment status, and income range. This information provided
descriptions to the participants’ general background.
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The second section consisted of general questions regarding the respondents’
technical background and familiarity with cloud computing. This included questions on
their experience in the different models of cloud computing as well as other technical
aspects such as computer programming, system administration, or website hosting. These
questions were asked first so that the respondents could start recalling the types of
computer activities they engaged in, which led to the next section where they were asked
to identify the specific activities they conducted on the cloud. Regarding concerns about
the respondents’ memory in answering questions, Blair, Czaja, and Blair (2014) stated it
was easier for respondents to answer general questions that then lead to specific
experiences.
This led to the third section, which contained the main questions for this study. This
section collected information on the respondents’ use of cloud resources and their reasons
for choosing them. Participants were asked to indicate from a Likert scale of one to five,
how often they have used the cloud for each of the listed ways. The list consisted of
different misuses of the cloud derived from previous literatures, as shown in Table 2.2 in
Chapter 2. Similarly, the list of issues in cloud security and forensics drawn from previous
research, as detailed in Table 2.1, was used as possible reasons for cybercriminals to choose
the cloud as their weapon. The importance of each of these factors in influencing the
participants’ choice in choosing the cloud was measured on another Likert scale of 1 (not
important) to 5 (very important).
Considering the nature of the target population, cybercriminals, the questions in the
last section were designed to evaluate the participants’ level of honesty when completing
the survey. Response bias was assessed using the Balanced Inventory of Desirable
Responding (BIDR) measures (Paulhus, 1988). The BIDR measured self-deceptive
positivity, which is the tendency to exaggerate claims, and impression management, where
respondents deliberately over-report their performance of desirable behaviors and
underreport undesirable ones (Paulhus, 1991). Participants were asked to rate their
agreement with 40 statements on a seven-point scale. The resulting scores were summed
to determine the level of self-deception and impression management.
The survey targeted at cybersecurity experts largely remained the same. The
wordings of some of the questions were changed due to the different audience. For example,
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in the third section, while the cybercriminals’ version asked “how often have you…”, the
cybersecurity experts’ questions were changed to “how often do you think
cybercriminals…”

3.3

Sample

This study sampled two separate groups of people, cybercriminals and cybersecurity
experts. In both cases, given that the targeted populations represented relatively small
proportions of the general society, a completely random sample would be inappropriate. A
non-probabilistic sampling method, snowball sampling, was used to obtain the required
number of responses. Snowball sampling was a technique used when the target population,
such as hackers, was difficult for researchers to identify, thus respondents were asked to
nominate other possible participants to help gain more responses (Kitchenham & Pfleeger,
2002). At the end of the surveys for both cybercriminals and cybersecurity experts, they
were asked to pass on the survey to others that are in their field who would be willing to
answer a few questions.
Cybersecurity experts were recruited through Purdue’s Center for Education and
Research in Information Assurance and Security (CERIAS) and LinkedIn. Emails were
sent out to the list of cybersecurity experts recommended by CERIAS, asking for their
participation in this study. The survey was also posted to several information security
related groups on LinkedIn, where experts in the field congregate to network and discuss
topics related to cybersecurity. Personal correspondents of the author working in the
cybersecurity field were also enlisted through LinkedIn to complete the survey. Each
participant was asked to recommend others in the same field to complete the survey if they
were willing.
For cybercriminals, participants were recruited from online forums they were likely
to frequent. Two forums where hackers congregate to discuss hacking techniques were
chosen: HackForums and BlackHatWorld. Portnoff et al. (2017) also chose these two
forums, among six others, in their research on cybercriminal markets. Both were still active
with large numbers of users. HackForums hosted more than five hundred thousand
registered users with new posts every few minutes; discussion topics range from malware,
botnets, to sharing hacking tools and requesting for hackers. BlackHatWorld frequently

22
had more than a thousand users online, and while it mostly focused on blackhat search
engine optimization techniques, there were also discussion boards on blackhat tools and
techniques in general. In preparation for posting the survey on these forums, accounts for
both forums were registered a few months prior and kept active on both. Cybercriminals
were asked to self-report whether they had previously engaged in certain illegal actions,
those who reported “No” to all questions were not considered cybercriminals and their
responses not analyzed.
This study focused on frequency analysis to determine the most commonly reported
misuses and reasons of cloud computing, comparing means to determine general trends
from results. A sample size of 40 was targeted for both cybercriminals and cybersecurity
experts. This number of 40 was, according to the Central Limit Theorem, the least required
to assume a normal distribution (Field, 2013). Furthermore, according to Cohen (1992), a
sample size of 30 would be sufficient for mean comparison with a medium effect size of .50.
Nevertheless, for both cybercriminals and cybersecurity experts, the author expected
missing data or incomplete responses since it was an internet-based study. Factoring in this
possibility, the author attempted to over sample and aimed for 50 respondents for each
group.

3.4

Procedure

A pilot test of the survey was conducted prior to sending it out to the target population.
The pilot test recruited cybersecurity and cyberforensics students to evaluate the phrasing
of the questions and the general representation of the survey to evaluate face validity. Once
the survey was tested and received IRB approval (Protocol # 1712020014; See Appendix
E), it was posted to the two hacker forums indicated in the previous section, and also
emailed to cybersecurity experts. Data collection ended after five weeks of first posting the
survey.
For the actual survey, it was conducted anonymously using Qualtrics. By using
Qualtrics, participants were assigned random ID numbers, and no identifying information
was collected. When participants clicked on the link to the survey, a consent form detailing
the purpose of the survey and assuring participants of the confidentiality and anonymity of
the data was shown. Once the participants agreed to the consent form, they were taken to
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the next page where they were asked to indicate their age and residency status. Participants
under the age of 18 and those who were not permanent residents of United States were
ineligible for the survey and were redirected to the “thank you” page at the end of the
survey. For U.S. permanent residents over the age of 18, they were sent to the next page of
the survey with the actual questions.

3.5

Summary

This chapter outlined the hypothesis of this study and the design and procedure in
conducting the research. An anonymous survey targeting cybercriminals and cybersecurity
experts will be conducted. For cybercriminals, the survey will be posted on popular hacker
forums, HackForums and BlackHatWorld. For cybersecurity experts, they will be emailed
to a list of professionals recommended by Purdue’s CERIAS. The survey will collect
information on their demographic background, experience with the cloud, experience in
misuses of the cloud, and reasons for choosing the cloud. The BIDR scale is also
incorporated to evaluate the respondents’ level of self-deception and impression
management when completing the survey.
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ANALYSIS AND RESULTS

4.1

Statistical Analysis

Frequency analysis was conducted on both the Exploits of the Cloud and Reasons
for Exploitation questions to determine the most commonly reported misuses and reasons
reported by both cybercriminals and cybersecurity experts. Respondents in the
cybercriminals group were asked whether they have used the cloud for malicious purposes.
The results were recoded with “No” and “Deny” being assigned a value of 0 and “Yes”
assigned as 1. Frequency analysis was used to calculate the sum for each type of exploit,
the sum representing the number of respondents admitting to having used the cloud in that
way.
Next, a zero-order correlation examined the relationship between the types of
misuses of cloud computing and the reasons for choosing the cloud. The same variables
were used for both groups to analyze whether there is a relationship between certain types
of reasons and misuses on the cloud. For the statistical analysis the author used SPSS
(Statistical Product and Service Solutions Version 24). Prior to analysis, statistical
significance was set at the alpha level of .05.

4.2

Descriptives

Before analyzing the collected data, they were examined to eliminate invalid
responses. Of the 60 responses collected for the cybersecurity experts group, 26 (45%)
were not eligible as part of the target population, with 16 of them being eliminated due to
not self-identifying as an expert. From the eligible 34, four were eliminated due to missing
data or unfinished questions, leaving 30 total valid responses for analysis. From the
cybercriminal group, a total of 40 responses were collected. Four did not continue after the
consent page, and 13 either were not permanent residents of the United States or declined
to answer that question. Of the 23 left, five more were eliminated for missing data, not
answering either the exploitation of the cloud or reasons for choosing the cloud questions,
leaving 18 valid responses for analysis. The BIDR scores were calculated for these 18
respondents using the dichotomous method suggested by Paulhus (1991). The results
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mostly ranged from 1 to 8 for self-deception and 1 to 4 for impression management, which
were similar or lower than the 7.6 and 4.3 mean indicated by Paulhus (1991).
As shown in Table 4.1, most of the experts surveyed are above the age of 40 (n = 15,
50%), while the majority of cybercriminals are between the ages of 18 and 25 (n = 11,
61%). Over half of both groups were male (n = 34, 71%) and identify as Caucasian (n =
27, 56%). Most of the experts had university level Computer Science or Information
Technology related training (n = 19, 63%), but over half of the cybercriminals responded
were self-taught (n = 12, 66%).
Table 4.1 Demographics of Experts and Cybercriminals

Experts
Cybercriminals
(n = 30)
(n = 18)
18~25
3 (10%)
11 (61%)
26~30
7 (23%)
5 (27%)
Age
31~40
5 (17%)
1 (6%)
> 40
15 (50%)
1 (6%)
Male
20 (67%)
14 (78%)
Female
8 (27%)
2 (11%)
Gender
Other
1 (3%)
0 (0%)
Decline
1 (3%)
2 (11%)
Caucasian / White
18 (60%)
9 (50%)
Ethnicity
Other
8 (47%)
1 (6%)
Decline
4 (13%)
8 (44%)
University-level
19 (63%)
4 (22%)
On the job
8 (27%)
1 (6%)
Type of
Self-taught
2 (7%)
12 (66%)
training
Other
1 (3%)
0 (6%)
Decline
0 (%)
1 (6%)
High School
3 (10%)
4 (22%)
Bachelor’s Degree
12 (40%)
9 (50%)
Education
Master’s
14 (47%)
0 (0%)
PhD
1 (3%)
1 (6%)
Decline
0 (0%)
4 (22%)
Note. Values represent frequency with percentages in parentheses.
Variable

Total
(n = 48)
14 (29%)
12 (25%)
6 (13%)
16 (33%)
34 (71%)
10 (21%)
1 (2%)
3 (6%)
27 (56%)
9 (19%)
12 (25%)
23 (48%)
9 (19%)
14 (29%)
1 (3%)
1 (3%)
7 (15%)
21 (44%)
14 (29%)
2 (4%)
4 (8%)
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4.3

Hypothesis Testing

 : Cybercriminals self-report exploiting cloud storage more compared to other types of
misuses.
Results of frequency analysis on the responses from cybercriminals supported this
hypothesis. Based on the responses, using the cloud for storage or sharing of illegal content
was the most commonly reported exploit. Most respondents admitted to having exploited
cloud storage before (n = 15, 83%), higher than all other types of exploits (see Table 4.2).
The next two most often reported misuses of the cloud were running online
password cracking tools (n = 11, 61%) and creating botnets (n = 9, 50%). The rest had
sums lower than nine, indicating a greater number of respondents reporting never to have
used the cloud in that way compared to those that have. Hosting malware on cloud
platforms and hosting phishing or scamming websites are the fourth most common exploits
of the cloud, with creating virtual machines to crack passwords, hosting malware on own
virtual machines, and using cloud virtual machines to conduct DDoS attacks following.
Table 4.2 Frequency of types of exploits cybercriminals used on the cloud

Types of Exploits
Store or share illegal content
Online password cracking tools
Botnet
Malware on cloud platforms
Hosted phishing/scam websites
Created VMs for password cracking
Malware on VMs
DDoS
Note. n = 18

f
15
11
9
7
7
6
5
4

 : There is a correlation between misuses of the cloud and reasons for choosing the cloud.
This hypothesis was supported for some, but not all, of the misuses and reasons for
choosing the cloud. Strong correlations were found from the cybercriminals’ responses but
few from the experts. A two-tailed bivariate correlation analyzed the relationship between
misuses and reasons for choosing the cloud (see Table 4.3). The difficulty to trace fake
accounts has a significantly positive correlation with all the types of misuses except for
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using cloud storage (online password cracking   = .58, malware on cloud platform
  = .62, hosting malicious websites   = .62, virtual machines for password cracking 
= .58, malware on virtual machines 



= .58, DDoS attacks 



= .55, creating botnets 




= .65). The ability to host machines in other countries was also significantly related to
creating botnets, 



= .64 with p = .01. Unlike the results from cybercriminals, there was

only two significant correlations from the cybersecurity experts’ responses (see Table 4.4).
Cheap services was positively related to both creating virtual machines for password
cracking,  = .46 with p = .01, and hosting malware on virtual machines,  = .43 with p
= .02.

Table 4.3 Correlation between misuse and reasons for cybercriminals

Types of Misuse
S
OPW
MCP
W
PWvm Mvm
DDoS Botnet
Cheap
0.24
0.23
0.13
-0.17
0.26
-0.04
-0.10
-0.26
Create accounts
0.28 0.63**
0.43
0.29
0.45
0.45
0.17
0.45
Trace accounts
0.18 0.58** 0.62** 0.62** 0.58** 0.58** 0.55** 0.65**
Easy to delete
0.10 0.56**
0.13
0.28
0.19
0.34
0.35
0.43
Hard to recover
-0.02 0.12
0.22
0.22
0.21
0.37
0.58*
0.26
Host abroad
0.09
0.35
0.50* 0.50*
0.43
0.43
0.30
0.64**
No local evidence -0.30 0.36
0.12
0.53*
0.24
0.24
0.40
0.32
Evidence hard to
-0.06 0.53*
0.20
0.51*
0.33
0.17
0.30
0.47*
collect
* p < 0.10 (two-tailed); ** p < 0.05 (two-tailed); Listwise N = 18
Note. S = Cloud storage; OPW = Online password cracking tools; MCP = Malware on cloud
platforms; W = Hosting phishing/scamming websites; PWvm = Creating virtual machines
for password cracking; Mvm = Hosting malware on virtual machines; DDoS = Distributed
Denial of Service attacks; Botnet = Creating botnets

28
Table 4.4 Correlation between misuse and reasons for experts

S
-0.05
-0.13
-0.11
-0.03
-0.09
-0.26
-0.20

OPW MCP
0.24 0.22
-0.05 0.05
0.09 -0.22
0.10 0.02
-0.12 -0.04
-0.28 -0.04
-0.13 -0.03

Types of Misuse
W PWvm Mvm DDoS
0.22 0.46** 0.43** -0.13
0.24 -0.09
-0.06 -0.03
0.17 -0.08 -0.36* 0.00
0.17
0.20
0.10
0.19
0.03 -0.08
-0.08
0.15
-0.02 -0.22
-0.18
0.05
0.12
0.06
-0.02 0.35*

Cheap
Create accounts
Trace accounts
Easy to delete
Hard to recover
Host abroad
No local evidence
Evidence hard to
-0.29
-0.11 -0.12 -0.03 -0.08
-0.11
collect
* p < 0.10 (two-tailed); ** p < 0.05 (two-tailed); Listwise N = 18

Botnet
0.12
-0.04
-0.21
0.00
0.10
0.04
0.23

0.10

0.03

Note. S = Cloud storage; OPW = Online password cracking tools; MCP = Malware on
cloud platforms; W = Hosting phishing/scamming websites; PWvm = Creating virtual
machines for password cracking; Mvm = Hosting malware on virtual machines; DDoS
= Distributed Denial of Service attacks; Botnet = Creating botnets

The correlation results were different between the responses from cybercriminals
and cybersecurity experts. For cybercriminals, there was a statistically significant
relationship between hard to trace fake accounts and all types of cloud misuse other than
storage. This meant those who considered having accounts that were hard to trace as
important were more likely to abuse the cloud for online password cracking, hosting
malware, hosting malicious websites, conducting DDoS attacks, and creating botnets.
Moreover, the more important they considered the ability to host machines in other
countries was, the more likely they were in creating botnets, as indicated by the positive
correlation between these two (



= .64).

Although the results were not statistically significant, the high correlation values
indicated that exploiting cloud storage was more likely caused by cheap services (
and ease in creating accounts (





= .24)

= .28) than other factors. Hosting malicious websites

and hosting malware on virtual machines were both strongly correlated to most of the
reasons, meaning those who used the cloud for these purposes were more likely to have
chosen the cloud for all of the reasons listed in Table 4.3 other than cheap services.
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From the experts’ perspective, the only significant relationships between type of
misuses and reasons for choosing the cloud was the positive correlations between cheap
services and both creating virtual machines for password cracking, with  = .46 (p = .01),
and hosting malware on virtual machines, with  = .43 with p = .02. This indicates that
those who consider cheap services important were more likely to use it for creating virtual
machines to crack passwords and host malware. Overall, there were few significant
relationships between types of misuse and reasons for choosing the cloud.
 : Cybercriminals and cybersecurity experts will report similar misuses of the cloud and
reasons for choosing the cloud.
Cybercriminals and cybersecurity experts reported similar results for most common
misuses and reasons. Frequency values for how likely cybersecurity experts think each type
of exploit could be used by cybercriminals on the cloud were calculated (see Table 4.5).
The most likely exploits identified were storage of illegal content and hosting phishing or
scamming websites on cloud platforms, neither of which had any responses less than
“sometimes.” There were 10 (33%) experts that considered cybercriminals “always” hosted
phishing or scamming websites, and another 15 (50%) considering it “very often.” For
cloud storage, although there were only eight (27%) that counted it as “always”, there were
19 (63%) experts who rated it “very often.”
Following that, experts identified malware hosting as the third most common
exploit, with both hosting on cloud platforms and on own virtual machines having nearly
no scores lower than “sometimes” (only one expert rated hosting malware on cloud
platforms as “rarely”). Over half of the experts gave high scores (either “very often” or
“always”) for hosting malware on cloud platforms (n = 24, 80%) and hosting malware on
virtual machines (n = 22, 73%).The next most common uses reported were creating virtual
machines for password cracking, running online password cracking tools, conducting
DDoS attacks using cloud virtual machines, and lastly, creating botnets with virtual
machines.
The experts were also asked to choose and rank the top five most common exploits
of the cloud. According to the rankings (see Table 4.6), the top two exploits of the cloud
were also storage of illegal content and hosting phishing or scamming websites. Most
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experts ranked them as top five cloud exploits, with nearly half ranking cloud storage as
number one (n = 12, 40%). Of the other misuses, three were considered to be in the top
five from more than half of the experts, even though the rankings differ. These three are
hosting malware on cloud platforms (n = 24, 80%), hosting malware on virtual machines
(n = 20, 67%), and running online password cracking tools (n = 17, 57%).
Table 4.5 Likeliness of Cybercriminals' Misuses reported by Experts

Misuses
Hosted phishing/scam websites
Store or share illegal content
Malware on VMs
Malware on cloud platforms
Created VMs for password cracking
Online password cracking tools
DDoS
Botnet
Note. Values represent frequencies.
n = 30.

Very
Often
15
19
11
16
13
18
9
10

Never Rarely Sometimes
0
0
0
0
0
1
0
1

0
0
1
0
2
2
5
3

5
3
7
6
8
4
11
12

Always
10
8
11
8
7
5
5
4

Table 4.6 Top 5 Exploits of Cloud Chosen by Experts

Misuses

*

5

4

3

2

1

Store or share illegal content
5
6
1
4
2
12
Hosted phishing/scam websites
9
3
2
6
5
5
Malware on cloud platforms
6
2
9
5
6
2
Online password cracking tools
13
4
3
3
4
3
Botnet
17
3
4
2
1
3
DDoS
18
5
0
2
3
2
Malware on VMs
10
3
5
6
6
0
Created VMs for password cracking
22
1
4
1
2
0
Note. Values represent frequencies of rank given. 1 through 5 represent the rankings
with 1 being highest. “*” represent those not included in the top 5.
n = 30.
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Using the cloud for storage of illegal contents was the most commonly reported
exploit by both cybercriminals and cybersecurity experts (see Table 4.7). Cybercriminals
also identified creating botnets as the third most common use, whereas for cybersecurity
experts, hosting malware on virtual machines was ranked in the top five instead of botnets.
Hosting phishing or scamming websites, hosting malware on cloud platforms, and running
online password cracking tools were on the top five list for both groups, albeit with
different rankings.
Table 4.7 Top 5 exploits of the cloud reported by both groups

Exploits of Cloud
Rank
1
2
3
4
5

Experts
Storage of illegal content
Phishing or scamming websites
Hosting malware on cloud platforms
Hosting malware on VM
Online password cracking tools

Cybercriminals
Storage of illegal content
Online password cracking tools
Creating botnets
Hosting malware on cloud platforms
Phishing or scamming websites

Means were calculated from running frequency analysis on the responses from both
groups (see Table 4.8). For cybercriminals, the five most important reasons were cheap
services, ability to host machines in other countries, easy to create fake accounts, hard to
trace fake accounts, and resources easy to delete. The top five reasons chosen by the experts
were easy to create fake accounts, followed by hard to trace fake accounts, able to host
machines in other countries, resources easy to delete, and cheap services.
Table 4.8 Reasons for choosing the cloud

Reasons for Exploiting Cloud
Cheap services
Able to host machines in other countries
Easy to create fake accounts
Hard to trace fake accounts
Resources easy to delete
No local evidence
Evidence hard to collect
Data hard to recover once deleted

Experts
3.60 (1.30)
4.30 (0.99)
4.80 (0.41)
4.57 (0.73)
3.73 (1.05)
3.50 (0.97)
3.60 (0.93)
3.33 (1.12)

Cybercriminals
4.47 (0.51)
4.29 (1.21)
3.94 (1.25)
3.65 (1.22)
3.18 (1.28)
3.00 (1.32)
2.94 (1.24)
2.82 (1.23)
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Note. Values represent means with standard deviations in parentheses.
Responses were measured on a Likert scale of 1 to 5.
The difference between the two groups in their perceived reasons for
cybercriminals choosing the cloud was analyzed using a one-way ANOVA. There were
significant differences in the perceived importance of cheap services, F(1, 44) = 7.75, p
< .01, ease in creating fake accounts, F(1, 44) = 11.52, p < .01, and hard to trace fake
accounts, F(1, 44) = 9.88, p < .01. These results indicate medium effect sizes between the
perceived importance of cheap services (ω = .36), easiness in creating accounts (ω = .43),
and difficulty in tracing fake accounts (ω = .40). From the means calculated in Table 4.8,
it could be seen that cybercriminals found cheap services more important than the experts
did. The experts in turn considered easy to create fake accounts and hard to trace fake
accounts more important than how cybercriminals perceived them. Despite the
differences in the rankings, the same five reasons were chosen by cybercriminals and
cybersecurity experts as the most important when choosing the cloud (see Table 4.9).
Table 4.9 Top five reasons for choosing the cloud reported by both groups

Rank
1
2
3
4
5

Reasons for Choosing Cloud
Experts
Cybercriminals
Easy to create fake accounts
Cheap services
Hard to trace fake accounts
Able to host in other countries
Able to host in other countries
Easy to create fake accounts
Resources easy to delete
Hard to trace fake accounts
Cheap services
Resources easy to delete

4.4

Post Hoc Analysis

A possible reason for cheap services being considered more important for
cybercriminals than experts may be because the majority of respondents from the
cybercriminals group were between the age of 18 to 25, a relatively young age with limited
financial resources. A post-hoc analysis was conducted to determine whether age was a
factor behind the strong positive correlation between cheap services and the different types
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of cloud exploits. A partial correlation controlling for age was conducted for the
cybercriminals group. The results in Table 4.10 showed similar values to those in Table
4.3. This meant that age was not a determining factor in cheap services being correlated to
the types of misuses, as there were still strong correlations even after the part correlated to
age was removed.
Table 4.10 Partial Correlation Between Types of Misuse and Reasons for Exploiting the
Cloud After Controlling for Age

Types of Misuse
S
OPW
MCP
W
PWvm Mvm
DDoS
Cheap
0.34
0.22
0.83
-0.23
0.26
-0.06
-0.27
Create accounts
0.42 0.68**
0.42
0.26
0.49*
0.49
0.01
Trace accounts
0.36 0.66** 0.66** 0.66** 0.69** 0.69**
0.45
Easy to delete
0.19 0.57**
0.09
0.25
0.19
0.35
0.25
Hard to recover
0.10
0.09
0.17
0.17
0.23
0.41
0.49*
Host abroad
0.23
0.36
0.51** 0.51** 0.49* 0.49*
0.14
No local evidence -0.25 0.36
0.08
0.52*
0.24
0.24
0.32
Evidence hard to
0.00 0.54*
0.16
0.49*
0.34
0.17
0.21
collect
* p < 0.10 (two-tailed); ** p < 0.05 (two-tailed); Listwise N = 18

Botnet
-0.26
0.52
0.81**
0.47
0.33
0.78
0.35
0.51

Note. S = Cloud storage; OPW = Online password cracking tools; MCP = Malware on cloud
platforms; W = Hosting phishing/scamming websites; PWvm = Creating virtual machines
for password cracking; Mvm = Hosting malware on virtual machines; DDoS = Distributed
Denial of Service attacks; Botnet = Creating botnets
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DISCUSSION

The purpose of this study was to examine how cloud computing was abused by
cybercriminals and what factors influenced them into choosing the cloud. Cybersecurity
experts were also surveyed for their perceptions on the misuses of cloud. The results were
analyzed to determine the most common misuses and reasons reported by cybercriminals
and cybersecurity experts.
The responses from cybercriminals showed the most commonly reported use of cloud
was for storing or sharing illegal content. This finding corresponded to previous studies
(Biggs & Vidalis, 2009; CSA, 2016) identifying cloud storage as one of the potential
concerns in regards to cloud technology. Biggs and Vidalis (2009) stated anonymity and
remoteness of cloud storage could be used to store illegal content such as child
pornography. The relative ease in using cloud storage could also be a factor in it being the
most common misuse of cloud. From the responses from cybercriminals, 66% (n = 12) of
them identified as being self-taught without formal computer or information technology
related training. Furthermore, 89% (n = 16) of respondents have used Software-as-aService before, compared to the 66% (n = 12) that have used Infrastructure-as-a-Service,
which requires more in-depth understanding of technology.
This factor can also explain the second most commonly reported exploit by
cybercriminals: running online password cracking tools. Using readily available tools
online requires little technical expertise, thus can be used by any type of cybercriminal.
The next most common misuses included creating botnets, hosting malware on cloud
platforms, and hosting malicious websites. These reasons were consistent with the concerns
raised by previous studies (Kolthof, 2015; Modi et al. 2013) indicating cybercriminals can
take advantage of the computing power and trusted IP addresses offered by cloud providers
to create botnets and hosting malicious websites.
The top five most commonly reported misuses of the cloud chosen by cybersecurity
experts were similar to those chosen by cybercriminals, with cloud storage being the
highest ranked type of exploit. But unlike cybercriminals, creating botnets was not on the
top five list for experts, and was instead ranked last among the likely ways cloud could be
abused. One factor in this discrepancy may be the nature of the hacker forums the survey
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was posted to. Although there are discussion boards on all types of hacking techniques and
tools, BlackHat World is primarily aimed at search engine optimization. Because of this,
botnets were frequently used for promotion of sites, whether by increasing traffic or
spamming. There were, however, three experts that also wrote mining for cryptocurrencies
(which often involved the use of botnets) as an additional common use of cloud resources
by cybercriminals.
Instead of botnets, hosting malware on the cloud, whether on preexisting platforms or
on self-configured virtual machines, was perceived by experts as one of the most common
ways cybercriminals use the cloud. One possible reason for malware hosting to be ranked
high by experts may be because the type of attacks associated with companies often involve
malware, such as stealing company data by exploiting vulnerabilities through malware.
Moreover, botnets were often created by distributing malware and gaining control of
machines. From the experts’ perception, this could also be included in hosting malware.
However, for the less experienced cybercriminals surveyed, they may not understand the
details of creating botnets and not realize they were also distributing malware. Apart from
cybercriminals, few studies have addressed the issue of hosting malware in the cloud before,
with only Kolthof (2015) listing it as one of the possible misuses of cloud computing. On
the contrary, numerous previous studies have pointed out the possibility of cloud resources
being utilized for DDoS attacks (CSA, 2016; Hernandez, 2016; Kolthof, 2015; Modi et al.,
2013; Wall, 2017), but it was one of the least reported exploits from both cybercriminals
and cybersecurity experts.
The most commonly reported reasons for choosing the cloud are similar between the
two groups. The anonymity and multiple jurisdiction issues of the cloud are all important
reasons for cybercriminals to choose the cloud. Many previous studies have emphasized
on the problem of cross jurisdiction that makes investigation involving cloud resources
hard. Biggs and Vidalis (2009) mentioned the difficulty in obtaining evidence when data
is stored in different countries than the suspect, and Freet et al. (2015) raised the problem
of a lack of international collaboration and legislation. Similar to these studies, the “ability
to host resources in other countries” was ranked high in both the responses from
cybercriminals and cybersecurity experts, being the second and third most important reason
reported by the two groups respectively.
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Another major reason that was considered important to both groups was the ease in
creating fake accounts on the cloud. Taylor et al. (2011) mentioned the ease in registering
accounts without sufficient verification of information allows cybercriminals to hide
behind the anonymity provided by the cloud. From the responses of the two groups, with
ease of registration and difficulty in tracing accounts both being among the top five factors,
anonymity of the cloud was one of the most important reasons cloud resources are being
exploited by cybercriminals. Furthermore, the availability of the cloud also induced
cybercriminals in choosing it. An expert responded with “readily available” as one of the
important reasons in the cloud being chosen. The importance of cheap services reported by
cybercriminals was a clear indication. One of the respondents from the cybercriminals
group wrote “free” as a very important factor, and on average, the low price of cloud
resources was ranked as most important reason for choosing the cloud by cybercriminals.
Although many past studies indicated issues about the volatile nature of data in the
cloud (Birk & Wegener, 2011; Hay et al., 2011; Reily et al., 2010; Taylor et al., 2011) and
the difficulties in obtaining evidence due to decentralized data (Freet et al., 2015; Hay et
al., 2011; Pichan et al., 2015; Taylor et al., 2011), these technical concerns did not seem to
be reflected in the responses from either cybercriminals nor cybersecurity experts. On the
contrary, though the ease of registration and the anonymity and availability that provides
were among the most important factors chosen by the two groups, few studies have
discussed these issues in the past. The responses from cybercriminals and cybersecurity
experts indicated that while there are still numerous technical challenges concerning cloud
investigations, cybercriminals do not usually consider these details that much. Instead, they
focused more on the policies of cloud service providers that allowed them anonymity and
access to cheap, readily available resources. The ease of creating fake accounts and
obtaining access to cheap, or even free, resources were the main reasons cloud computing
has become popular among those with malicious intents, as evidenced by the responses
from cybercriminals and experts.
However, there were discrepancies between the two groups when the correlations
between misuses and reasons for choosing the cloud were calculated. Although only few
of the correlations were significant, which may have been affected by the low sample size,
many of the values were large enough to indicate a strong correlation between the type of
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cloud exploit and reason. For cybercriminals, there were strong positive correlations
between most of the reasons and types of misuses. However, there were a number of
reasons that had negative correlations to the types of misuses from the experts group. For
example, jurisdiction was negatively correlated to all exploits except DDoS and botnets,
whereas it was positively correlated to all the types of exploits for cybercriminals. This
meant that although cybercriminals found jurisdiction to be an important factor in using
the cloud for criminal purposes, experts did not consider it to influence crime in the cloud.
Another example was the correlation between hard to trace accounts and hosting malware
on virtual machines. While cybercriminals considered it a very important factor with a
strong positive correlation of 



= .58, experts did not think it as a reason that induced

criminals to host malware in the cloud ( = - .36).
In this study, cybersecurity experts and cybercriminals both indicated cloud storage as
the most common use of cloud computing by cybercriminals. After cloud storage,
cybercriminals reported most frequently using the cloud for running online password
cracking tools, creating botnets, hosting malware, and hosting phishing or spamming
websites. Other than similarly choosing cloud storage as the most common type of misuse,
cybersecurity experts chose hosting phishing or spamming websites, hosting malware, and
running online password cracking tools as subsequent common abuses of cloud computing.
Both cybercriminals and cybersecurity experts indicated ease of creating fake accounts,
hard to trace fake accounts, cheap services, ability to host services in other countries, and
resources easy to delete as the top five reasons for using the cloud for criminal purposes.
These factors suggest that the anonymity made possible by cloud service providers, along
with legal jurisdiction issues raised by the global nature of the cloud are major advantages
taken by cybercriminals, inducing them in using the cloud for criminal purposes. If cloud
providers do not want their services used for criminal purposes and harm their reputation,
they should implement stricter verification policies to reduce the number of untraceable
fake accounts.
This study showed the ways cybercriminals could take advantage of cloud computing
and it is important for law enforcement to take these into consideration during
investigations. For example, it is important for law enforcement to take into account data
stored in the cloud when searching for evidence. It is apparent that cybercriminals are
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taking advantage of cloud storage to store and share illegal content, possibly transferring
all incriminating data to the cloud instead of on local drives where they could be easily
seized by investigators. It may be more valuable to conduct thorough investigations of their
online accounts compared to their local machines and drives. Furthermore, since the ease
of creating fake accounts and cheap services were top factors for cybercriminals in
choosing the cloud, law enforcement should consider the possibility of them having
multiple accounts and conduct searches on all of them.

5.1

Limitations

This study surveyed cybercriminals limited to two online forums and obtained 18
valid responses. This may not be representative of the population that takes advantage of
cloud computing for criminal purposes. Limiting the respondents to those from two forums
could result in sampling bias and limits external validity. For example, the forums may be
more focused on certain topics and only attract people with similar skill levels. As neither
of the two forums chosen were from the dark web, the results cannot be generalized to
cybercriminals as a whole.
The snowballing method used for sampling cybersecurity experts led to many of the
respondents being friends or associates recruited by others who took the survey. Because
of this, as with cybercriminals, the results are limited in external validity and cannot be
generalized to all cybersecurity experts. Furthermore, the survey was limited to U.S.
permanent residents, thus the results cannot represent all cybercriminals or experts
worldwide.

5.2

Conclusion

As cloud technology becomes more widespread and consumers continue to shift their
data to the cloud, it has also presented new possibilities for cybercriminals. The abundance
of cheap, available resources provided by the cloud has allowed cybercriminals to take
advantage of them for criminal purposes. This study surveyed two groups of participants,
one consisting of cybersecurity experts and the other cybercriminals. From the responses
obtained, both groups indicated cloud storage as the most common use of cloud computing
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by cybercriminals. The ease of creating fake accounts, low prices of cloud services, and
ability to host machines in other countries were the most important factors cybercriminals
considered when choosing the cloud, showing that the anonymity made possible by cloud
service providers, along with legal jurisdiction issues raised by the global nature of the
cloud are major advantages taken by cybercriminals.
Future research can expand on the target population and recruit from a wider range
of forums and channels, including if possible, cybercriminals from the dark web. This will
provide a more comprehensive result that can better represent the perspectives of most
cybercriminals. Moreover, the list of reasons for choosing the cloud and type of misuses
used in this study were drawn from previous studies reviewed by the author. These lists are
rudimentary, and although the current study provided an “other” option for participants to
write any responses not provided in the choices, most did not fill them out. Future studies
can look to compose more complete lists that provide more detailed and varied items for
respondents, incorporating as many possible types of misuses and reasons as possible.
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APPENDIX A. IRB NARRATIVE

NON-EXEMPT APPLICATION NARRATIVE

A.

PROPOSED RESEARCH RATIONALE
The purpose of this study is to understand the different ways the cloud environment
can be abused by cybercriminals and the reasons behind them from both the
perspectives of cybercriminals and cybersecurity experts.

B.

SPECIFIC PROCEDURES TO BE FOLLOWED
In order to collect data on self-reported criminal behavior, participants will be
recruited through the online hacker forums, HackForums and BlackHatWorld. The
survey link will be posted on the forums asking participants to respond about the
ways in which they use the cloud. The two hacker forums chosen are both active
forums on the open web. HackForums hosts more than five hundred thousand
registered users with new posts every few minutes; discussion topics range from
malware, botnets, to sharing hacking tools and requesting for hackers.
BlackHatWorld frequently has more than a thousand users online. No identifiable
information will be collected.
In order to solicit cybersecurity experts, participants will be recruited through
Purdue’s Center for Education and Research in Information Assurance and Security
(CERIAS) and LinkedIn. The survey link will be emailed to contacts on Purdue
CERIAS’ email list and cybersecurity groups on LinkedIn, asking participants to
respond about the ways in which they perceive cybercriminals use the cloud. At the
end of the email, participants are asked to forward the link to others in the field who
may be willing to participate. No identifiable information will be collected.
The anonymous survey will be hosted by Purdue University’s Qulatrics website
where the study will take place. The opening page of the survey will include the
consent form, which is the same for all participants. Both sets of respondents will
also receive a demographics page, which includes questions about age and permanent
residency. If the participant is under 18 or is not a permanent resident of the US,
he/she will not be allowed to continue. If the respondent agrees to participate in the
study, the self-reported cybercriminals will receive one set of questions asking them
how they use the cloud; cybersecurity experts will receive a separate set of questions
asking them how they perceive cybercriminals’ exploitation of the cloud. Finally both
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sets of participants will receive the BIDR scale which measure social desirability. At
the end of the study, a final page is presented that thanks the participant. No
identitying information will be collected; this survey will be completely anonymous.
The Demographics and Technical Background section includes six questions
collecting information on the participants’ age, education, income, and experience
with cloud technology.
(Cybercriminal version) The Exploits of the Cloud questions include one multiple
choice question and 9 statements on reasons for using the cloud. The multiple choice
question asks participants to select all the ways in which they have used the cloud for
before, and they are asked to rate the 9 statements on a 5-point scale. The 5-point
scale range from 1 (not important) to 5 (very important).
(Cybersecurity expert version) The Perceived Exploits of the Cloud questions include
10 statements on possible exploits of the cloud, 9 statements on reasons for using the
cloud, and one ranking question. Participants are asked to rate the 10 statements on a
5-point scale from 1 (never) to 5 (very often) and rate the 9 statements on a 5-point
scale ranging from 1 (not important) to 5 (very important). They are also asked to
choose the top five ways cloud is exploited and rank them in order.

C.

The Balanced Inventory of Desirable Responding (BIDR) includes two sub-scales,
Impression Management and Self-Deception Enhancement. It consists of 40
statements about the participants themselves, where they are asked to rate the
statements on a 7-point scale. The 7-point scale range from 1 (not true) to 7 (very
true).
SUBJECTS TO BE INCLUDED

D.

Participants will be 100 men and women recruited through two online hacker forums
HackForums and BlackHatWorld, and 100 men and women who are cybersecurity
experts recruited through Purdue CERIAS and LinkedIn. Participants will be required
to over the age of 18 and to be permanent residents of the United States.
RECRUITMENT OF SUBJECTS AND OBTAINING INFORMED CONSENT
Respondents (N = 200) will be solicited from the two online forums and contacted
through Purdue CERIAS and LinkedIn. A solicitation for study participation will be
posted to the two forums and emailed to the mailing list provided by Purdue CERIAS
and LinkedIn group. This solicitation will include a survey link that respondents can
click on if they are interested in participation. This link will direct them to Purdue
University’s Qualtrics website, where the entirety of study procedures will take place.
The opening page of the Qualtrics survey will include the Informed Consent (see
Attachment: Informed Consent). If respondents choose to proceed with participation,
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E.

they will click on the survey link and be directed into the survey. No identifying
information will be collected. The consent form will state that only individuals 18
years of age and older AND permanent residents in the United States will be able
eligible to complete the study. In addition, the demographics questionnaire will
specifically ask the respondents to identify their current age and permanent residence
– any individual who is not 18 years of age or older AND a permanent resident of the
US will be screened out of the study and not eligible to participate.
PROCEDURES FOR PAYMENT OF SUBJECTS
N/A

F.

CONFIDENTIALITY
The study is completely anonymous. All data will be collected via an internet-based
survey via Qualtrics. No identifying information will be collected, such as IP
addresses or names.

G.

A copy of the raw data will be downloaded from Qualtrics and stored on the PI’s
computer. This raw data will already be anonymous since no identifying information
will be collected in the survey. The file will be saved in an encrypted format. Only
the PI and Co-PI will have access to the encrypted file. The file will be kept for seven
years according to APA standards.
POTENTIAL RISKS TO SUBJECTS

H.

The risks are considered minimal for this research; that is, they are no greater than
everyday activities. The majority of the questions asked are taken from inventories
used to describe normal-range personality traits and should not lead to discomfort in
participants. The study is anonymous. The only risk is breach of confidentiality in
that the respondent tells someone that they completed the study; however, even then
it will not be possible to link the responses back to an individual. The safeguards used
to minimize this risk can be found in the confidentiality section.
BENEFITS TO BE GAINED BY THE INDIVIDUAL AND/OR SOCIETY

I.

There are no direct benefits to individuals completing the study. Potential benefits to
society are small based on this study alone. There may be broader benefits to society
to be had from the larger program of research. Understanding the common ways and
reasons cybercriminals exploit the cloud to commit crime can show cloud providers
the kinds of services that are more susceptible to abuse, and policy loopholes that
cybercriminals could take advantage of. This can point cloud providers in the right
direction to in turn implement stricter policies and detection mechanisms. Comparing
cybersecurity experts’ views on these questions also determines whether the general
concerns and challenges identified by them are the same as what are self-repoted by
the cybercriminals.
INVESTIGATOR’S EVALUATION OF THE RISK-BENEFIT RATIO
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Risks are minimal, no greater than that encountered in daily life.
J.

WRITTEN INFORMED CONSENT FORM (to be attached to the Application
Narrative)
● Submitted a copy of the informed consent document in the form that it will be
disseminated to all participants.

K.

WAIVER OF INFORMED CONSENT OR SIGNED CONSENT
The researchers request a Waiver of Signed Consent since this is an Internet-based
study. Although there will be a consent form, the respondents will not be “signing”
the online form but instead clicking “Agree” as an indication of their consent. The
research study is completely anonymous and does not pose greater than minimal risk
to general Internet users. Yes, the current study asks questions regarding deviant
behavior so we want to make sure that this study is completely anonymous and does
not record any identifiable information. No the current study does not require signed
consent if in a non-research context. Yes, the respondents will still read a consent
form, it will just be online, and they will indicate their consent by clicking on “agree”
rather than signing their name.

L.

We request a waiver to include our names and contact information (i.e. Email) in the
consent form of the study. We do still have the contact information for Purdue’s IRB.
This is requested because we are studying cybercriminal behavior and there is a fear
of targeting the PI. There have been cases of researchers studying cybersecurity being
targeted by hackers. This request was personally made by the PI to Professor Jeannie
D. Diclementi, who provided guidance and stated that this would be an acceptable
reason to not include the PI’s information in the consent form.
INTERNATIONAL RESEARCH
N/A

M.

SUPPORTING DOCUMENTS
1. Informed Consent Form
2. Demographics
3. Exploits of the Cloud
4. Perceived Exploits of the Cloud
5. Balanced Inventory of Desirable Responding (BIDR)
6. Recruitment Materials
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APPENDIX B. CONSENT FORM

RESEARCH PARTICIPANT CONSENT FORM
Perceptions of Cloud Usage
Purdue University

What is the purpose of this study? The purpose of this study is to survey people’s preferences towards
using cloud computing and the reasons behind them.
What will I do if I choose to be in this study? The anonymous, online survey will be administered using a
secure website. Once you have read this consent form, and agree to voluntarily participate, you will be taken
to a secure website to complete the online survey. You may withdraw from the survey at anytime and you
may skip or decline any questions that you do not wish to answer.
How long will I be in the study? Most people take about 10 minutes to complete the survey.
What are the possible risks or discomforts? The risks to you are minimal. They are not greater than those
ordinarily encountered in daily life. Please know that this is an anonymous survey that uses a secure link.
The survey is anonymous because we will not be able to link your responses back to you – we do not ask for
any identifiable information (Ex. name). While completing the survey, the only risk to you might be if
someone were to see your responses to the survey, so we recommend that you take this survey when you
have complete privacy. Since the survey is anonymous, no one will know that you completed this survey
unless you personally tell him or her, so breach of confidentiality is a risk and the safeguards used to minimize
this risk can be found in the confidential section below.
Are there any potential benefits? There are no direct benefits to you. Eventually, we hope to publish the
research results.
Will I receive payment or other incentive? The survey is entirely voluntary and there will be no
compensation.
Will information about me and my participation be kept confidential? We do not ask for your name or
any other information that could be used to identify you at any time before, during, or after the survey. No
IP addresses will be record ed. There will be no way to determine where the survey was taken or by whom.
Instead, the survey software will randomly assign an ID number to your responses. This means that the
responses to the questionnaires cannot be linked or matched to you, which mea ns your responses will remain
completely anonymous. Only researchers associated with this study will have access to the data. In addition
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to the data being anonymous, it will be stored electronically in an encrypted format. The encrypted data will
be kept indefinitely and will be used only for research purposes. The project's research records may be
reviewed by departments at Purdue University responsible for regulatory and research oversight.
What are my rights if I take part in this study? Your participation in this study is voluntary. You may
choose not to participate or, if you agree to participate, you can withdraw your participation at any time
without penalty or loss of benefits to which you are otherwise entitled.
Who can I contact if I have questions about the study? If you have questions about your rights while
taking part in the study or have concerns about the treatment of research participants, please call the Human
Research Protection Program at (765) 494 - 5942, email (irb@purdue.edu ) or write to:
Human Research Protection Program - Purdue University
Ernest C. Young Hall, Room 1032
155 S. Grant St.,
West Lafayette, IN 47907 - 2114
Documentation of Informed Consent. I have had the opportunity to read this consent form and have the
research study explained. I have had the opportunity to ask questions about the research study, and my
questions have been answered. I am prepared to participate in the research study described above. If I wish,
I may print this form for my records. If you agree, please click on the “I Agree” button below. Otherwise, we
thank you for your time and ask that you click on the “I Do Not Agree” button.

I Agree

I Do Not Agree
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APPENDIX C. SURVEY

Validation:
What is your age?

_____ years

*Respondents under 18 years of age will be sent to the “end of survey”.

Do you currently reside in the United States?

Yes

No

Decline

*Non-US residents/Decline will be sent to the “end of survey”.

Do you consider yourself an expert in cybersecurity?

Yes

*Non-experts/Decline will be sent to the “end of survey”.
Demographics:
What is your gender?
__ Male
__ Female
__ Non Binary
__ Decline

Which ethnicity do you identify with the most (please select one):
__ Asian
__ Black
__ Caucasian / White
__ Hispanic / Latino
__ Other (please specify
__ Decline

What is your highest level of completed education?
__ Less than 12 years of high school or secondary education

No

Decline
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__ High School
__ Bachelors Degree
__ Masters Degree
__ PhD
__ Decline

What is your current employment status?
__ Full-Time
__ Part-Time
__ Retired
__ Student
__ Unemployed

What is your current annual income range from only employment sources?
__ $0 - $20,000
__ $20,001 - $40,000
__ $40,001 - $60,000
__ $60,001 - $80,000
__ $80,001 - $100,000
__ More than $100,001

Technical Background:

What type of IT and/or computer science training have you had?
__ University-level training in Computer Science and/or Information Technology
__ On-the-job or other related IT training
__ No formal training/self taught
__ Decline

What kind of cloud services have you used before?
__ Infrastructure (E.g. created/configured own virtual machine)
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__ Platform (E.g. deployed websites/applications)
__ Software (E.g. online apps/tools)
__ Never used cloud before

Exploits of the Cloud

The following questions are about behaviors which may or may not be perceived as illegal.
We are interested in a wide range of behaviors, so please answer honestly. Remember this
survey is completely anonymous.
Have you ever used cloud resources for illegal purposes?
__ Yes
__ No

If yes, have you ever used cloud resources for the following purposes?

Yes
Stored illegal content on cloud storage
Shared illegal content using cloud storage/platform
Ran online password cracking tools
Hosted malware on cloud platforms
Hosted phishing/scam websites on cloud platforms
Created cloud VMs to run password cracking tools
Hosted malware on cloud VMs
Conducted DDoS attacks using cloud VMs
Created botnet with cloud VMs
Other purposes (specify below)

No

Decline
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When choosing to use the cloud, how important are the following in making that choice?

Not

Somewhat

Neutral

Important

Important

Very
Important

Cheap services
Easy to create fake accounts
Hard to trace fake accounts
Resources used are easy to
delete afterwards
Data hard to recover once
deleted
Able to host machines/storage
in other countries
No local evidence
Evidence in the cloud is hard to
collect
Other reasons (specify below)

Perceived Exploits of the Cloud
From your experiences, how likely do you think cybercriminals would use cloud resources
for the following purposes?
Never

Rarely

Sometimes

Very
Often

Stored illegal content on cloud
storage
Shared illegal content using cloud
storage/platform
Ran online password cracking tools

Always
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Hosted malware on cloud platforms
Hosted phishing/scam websites on
cloud platforms
Created cloud VMs to run password
cracking tools
Hosted malware on cloud VMs
Conducted DDoS attacks using cloud
VMs
Created botnet with cloud VMs
Other purposes (specify below)

What do you think are the top five exploits of cloud computing? Please select five from the
misuses listed above and rank them from 1 to 5:
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.

When cybercriminals choose to use the cloud, how important do you think the following
reasons are for them in making that choice?

Not
Important
Cheap services
Easy to create fake accounts
Hard to trace fake accounts
Resources used are easy to delete

Somewhat

Neutral

Important

Very
Important
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afterwards
Data hard to recover once deleted
Able to host machines/storage in
other countries
No local evidence
Evidence in the cloud is hard to
collect
Other reasons (specify below)
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Balanced Inventory of Desirable Responding (BIDR) (Paulhus, 1991)
Using the scale below as a guide, write a number beside each statement to indicate how
true it is.
+
+
+
+
+
+ +
1
2
3
4
5
6 7
not true
somewhat
very
true
____ 1. My first impressions of people usually turn out to be right.
____ 2. It would be hard for me to break any of my bad habits.
____ 3. I don't care to know what other people really think of me.
____ 4. I have not always been honest with myself.
____ 5. I always know why I like things.
____ 6. When my emotions are aroused, it biases my thinking.
____ 7. Once I've made up my mind, other people can seldom change my opinion.
____ 8. I am not a safe driver when I exceed the speed limit.
____ 9. I am fully in control of my own fate.
____ 10. It's hard for me to shut off a disturbing thought.
____ 11. I never regret my decisions.
____ 12. I sometimes lose out on things because I can't make up my mind soon enough.
____ 13. The reason I vote is because my vote can make a difference.
____ 14. My parents were not always fair when they punished me.
____ 15. I am a completely rational person.
____ 16. I rarely appreciate criticism.
____ 17. I am very confident of my judgments
____ 18. I have sometimes doubted my ability as a lover.
____ 19. It's all right with me if some people happen to dislike me.
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____ 20. I don't always know the reasons why I do the things I do.
Using the scale below as a guide, write a number beside each statement to indicate how
true it is.
+
1
not true

+
2

+
3

+
4
somewhat

+
5

+ +
6 7
very

true

____ 21. I sometimes tell lies if I have to.
____ 22. I never cover up my mistakes.
____ 23. There have been occasions when I have taken advantage of someone.
____ 24. I never swear.
____ 25. I sometimes try to get even rather than forgive and forget.
____ 26. I always obey laws, even if I'm unlikely to get caught.
____ 27. I have said something bad about a friend behind his/her back.
____ 28. When I hear people talking privately, I avoid listening.
____ 29. I have received too much change from a salesperson without telling him or her.
____ 30. I always declare everything at customs.
____ 31. When I was young I sometimes stole things.
____ 32. I have never dropped litter on the street.
____ 33. I sometimes drive faster than the speed limit.
____ 34. I never read sexy books or magazines.
____ 35. I have done things that I don't tell other people about.
____ 36. I never take things that don't belong to me.
____ 37. I have taken sick-leave from work or school even though I wasn't really sick.
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____ 38. I have never damaged a library book or store merchandise without reporting it.
____ 39. I have some pretty awful habits.
____ 40. I don't gossip about other people's business.
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APPENDIX D. RECRUITMENT MATERIAL

Email to CERIAS

Hello,
My name is Pei-Ting Lee, and I am a graduate student pursuing my Masters in Cyber
Forensics from the Department of Computer & Information Technology at Purdue. The
Principal Investigator of this study is Dr. Kathryn Seigfried-Spellar. I am conducting
research on the ways cloud computing can be abused by cybercriminals for malicious
purposes. This will help in understanding criminal behaviors in the cloud and the
vulnerabilities of cloud policies.
To do this, I would greatly appreciate if you could complete a short survey on your
understanding of cybercriminals’ misuses of cloud resources. The survey will be conducted
online and take approximately 10 minutes. It is anonymous and your participation is
completely voluntary.
The survey can be accessed at:
Qualtrics.purdue.edu
If there are other people you know who may also have experience and insight to this topic,
and would be willing to fill out this survey, please forward this email to them.
If there are any questions or require clarification on anything, please contact me at
lee2521@purdue.edu. Thank you for your time and participation.
Best Regards,
Pei-Ting Lee
Dr. Kathryn Seigfried-Spellar
Purdue University
Department of Computer and Information Technology
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Post on Hacker Forums
Anonymous survey: Use of cloud computing resources
You have the opportunity to be a part of research! Researchers from Purdue University are
conducting an anonymous study on people’s use of cloud resources and reasons for
choosing the cloud.
The study involves a short, anonymous survey. It will take approximately 10 minutes to
complete. We will not be collecting any identifiable information (e.g., your name, IP
address). Instead, your responses to the survey will be coded with a random “ID number”
so we will not have to ask you for any personal information.

Anonymous Survey link: qualtrics.purdue.edu

Post on LinkedIn
I am conducting research on cybersecurity concerns related to the cloud. Please find the
anonymous survey at the following link: qualtrics.purdue.edu

Thank You Web Page (Final Page of Study)
*Final page for those who successfully completed study

Thank You!

We appreciate you taking the time to be a part of research.

“Sorry Page”
*Last page for respondents declined consent or screened out of survey because
under 18 or not a US resident

Sorry, but based on one or more of your responses, you did not qualify for this study.
Thank you for your interest.
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APPENDIX E. IRB APPROVAL

